information on the Khatsara and Koko, who are undoubtedly even less known outside specialist circles than the Khache. We also learn here that Republican China was largely absent from Tibetan affairs in that period, a fact seldom included in China’s claims to Tibet made after 1949.

We pick up the Khache thread again in the last three chapters of the book, which focus on the more well-known events in Tibet starting in 1950, through the exodus of Tibetans to India and the new position into which the Khache were thrown in Tibet in their new diaspora homes. The chapter “Himalayan Asia” extends the argument about Tibet’s agency in Himalayan politics made earlier and illustrates the major change in the status of Tibet’s residents that came with the CCP’s forced assimilation of Tibet into China after 1949. Now all Tibetan citizens were automatically viewed as Chinese citizens, and liminal people such as the Khache, Khatsara, and Koko were forced to make difficult choices about their national identity.

The last two chapters showcase the attack on Khache by other Tibetans in Lhasa in 1960 and the exodus from Tibet of some 80,000 people by 1962. As the final chapter, “Prisoners of Shangri-La,” vividly illustrates, the Khache were forced into a terrible dilemma during the events of 1960 and China’s hardening position towards Tibet, having to choose between claiming Tibetan (aka Chinese) or Indian identity. Atwill’s initial characterization of the Khache as neither ignored nor integrated comes full circle here in tracking the fate of Khache who left Tibet. They went from living as Tibetans among Tibetans to being “ambiguous, anonymous, and overshadowed” Muslims in their adopted homeland (p. 151).

Atwill’s recovery of the story of the Khache is engaging, original, and a must-read for anyone interested in Asian history or contemporary affairs. It is also a solemn reminder that modern states’ obsession with defining and controlling citizenship by hard and exclusive categories provides no space or comfort for people whose history in a different time and place continue to shape their lives as liminal subjects.

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Red China’s Green Revolution: Technological Innovation, Institutional Change, and Economic Development under the Commune. By JOSHUA EISENMAN.
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The people’s commune is arguably the most maligned and misunderstood institution of socialist China, and Joshua Eisenman’s book Red China’s Green Revolution makes a very important contribution to the much-needed reassessment of this political, economic, and military organization. He argues that the commune was not an economic failure, as maintained by official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) historiography since the 1980s and mainstream Western academic and popular opinions alike. Rather, it was an effective means of advancing agricultural development, and even rural industrialization, raising total food production and the standards of living of rural workers. Consequently, he also argues that the commune was not abandoned due to the bottom-up initiative of
peasants who pursued a more economically productive arrangement in the household responsibility system, again as maintained by both CCP official historiography and mainstream Western literatures. Instead, decollectivization was a political decision imposed top-down by the reformist faction around Deng Xiaoping, who did so to consolidate their power in the aftermath of Mao’s death. Therefore, Eisenman’s book is important for being much more than a study of rural China and agricultural development, as it contributes to an increasingly well-formulated critique of China’s engagement with global capitalism.

The book’s arguments are very convincing, and although it is sometimes repetitive, it is well organized and written very clearly, featuring a foreword and prologue that provide succinct accounts of the existing literature, debates, and Eisenman’s contribution. The book is well researched, drawing on careful readings of government documents, newspapers and other materials from the period, extensive secondary literature, and a wealth of statistical data on production of grains, pigs, and edible oil at national and provincial levels, as well as the expansion of irrigation and the production and use of electricity, tractors, fertilizers, pesticides, and high-yield seed varieties. There is also much data on population size and commune labor; technical and teacher training; student enrollment; arable land; and, in a province-level case study, the number of communes and their average number of brigades and production-team subunits. Moreover, the book features appendices with eleven pages of additional statistical data and eighty pages of previously untranslated key government documents. Thus, it serves as a valuable English-language resource on agricultural development in China during the 1960s and 1970s. One aspect that could have been stronger, however, is Eisenman’s defense of the reliability of this data. He addresses this explicitly in the introduction (pp. 20–21), and although his defense is robust, it focuses only on data about agricultural output, from which his main arguments follow. Yet more could have been done to dispel skepticism about the quality of statistical data on socialist China more generally.

After the introduction, chapter 2 provides a historical account of the origins and early transformations of the commune from the 1950s through the 1960s. It distinguishes different forms of cooperativism and collectivism during the period and indicates the political struggles that led to each transformation, including how the catastrophic results of collectivization during the Great Leap Forward were quickly reversed as household plots, cottage industries, and rural markets were allowed to coexist with reformed communes thereafter.

Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of the last and most productive phase of the commune, which Eisenman calls the “Green Revolution Commune.” It contains the empirical heart of his narrative, demonstrating how agricultural investments and technological innovations during the 1970s, which resulted from collectivization, drove rising agricultural productivity and outputs. A downside of this chapter (and so of Eisenman’s book as a whole) is its relatively simple account of, and uncritical approach to, what constituted the “green revolution” in China. Thus, Eisenman’s book title is somewhat misleading, and those interested in a more nuanced discussion of the “green revolution” in China should turn instead to Sigrid Schmalzer’s recent book on the topic, as both books complement each other particularly well for a reassessment of Maoist agricultural and rural development.¹

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 form the analytical core of the book, where Eisenman examines the main economic, political, and organizational sources of agricultural productivity in the communes. In short, the communes extracted capital and savings from their members through the workpoint system, in which individuals were remunerated with points corresponding to their labor for the commune, and those points were only converted into payment in grain or cash at the end of the harvest season, after all costs, taxes, and community funds were extracted for reinvestment into collective infrastructure and technology. Chapter 4 explains this with theoretical concepts from classical and neoclassical economics (as “super-optimal investment” with high savings rates). Chapter 5 explains how this system of collective remuneration was sustained despite high rates of extraction, relying on a mixture of Maoist ideology, authentic dedication to the collective, and social pressure from the people’s militia. Interestingly, Eisenman challenges Chinese exceptionalism, identifying Maoism with religious revivals and showing how similar religiosity was also integral to other communal experiments in Europe, the United States, and beyond. Both chapters explain how these economic and political arrangements effectively curtailed “free riding,” “brain drain,” and other collective action problems. Finally, chapter 6 attempts to measure econometrically the effects of the commune’s organization size and structure on its economic productivity, drawing on county-level data from Henan Province. Although three of Eisenman’s four hypotheses in this chapter do not yield statistically significant results, he does demonstrate that the relative size of communes and their subunits did have some effect on agricultural productivity, as small communes with small teams allowed for more worker supervision and greater productivity, while larger communes with larger teams made up for this shortfall in close supervision with greater economies of scale in the allocation of productive factors.

The seventh and final chapter before the conclusion examines newspaper articles from the 1970s, memoirs and other accounts of the leading politicians during the era, and a rich body of secondary literature to reconstruct a narrative about the political struggles among top CCP leaders and their factions during the 1970s and early 1980s. Eisenman demonstrates how decollectivization resulted from the victory of Deng Xiaoping and his “reformist” faction, who abolished the communes to consolidate their power against factions of “radicals” associated with the Cultural Revolution and “loyalists” surrounding Mao Zedong’s appointed successor, Hua Guofeng. The chapter successfully shows how decollectivization favored the “reformists,” and also how they actively cultivated the false propagandistic narrative of a “bottom-up” push for decollectivization because of the economic “inefficiencies” of the communes.

While making an important contribution to the study of the commune from the 1950s through the early 1980s, the book abstains from drawing implications for contemporary agricultural and rural development (again, see Schmalzer for a good counterpoint). Now that the inefficiencies of individual household production, low rates of investment in the countryside, and dramatic rural exodus are threatening national food security and social stability, the CCP has grown concerned and initiated various reforms to address these problems, which Eisenman demonstrates were previously addressed successfully through collectivization. Yet the government’s reduction of taxation on peasants and increased funds and social programs for “poverty alleviation” and “rural vitalization” are being promoted alongside a dramatic surge of capitalist social relations in the countryside, including wage labor and the effective privatization of farmland through the transfer of land use rights from poor peasants to wealthier farmers, urban investors, and agribusiness corporations. Eisenman could, and perhaps should,
contribute more explicitly to a timely critique of ongoing capitalist transformations in China’s countryside.

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The battle over cyberspace and the Internet in China is often depicted as one of state versus society. The pluralist nature of the Internet means that dissenting voices may undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, the party-state continually attempts to gain greater control over the Internet through state censorship and the “Great Firewall,” while netizens (citizens of the Internet who are actively involved in online communities) persistently resist censorship and find creative ways to oppose the regime. In Contesting Cyberspace in China, Rongbin Han unpacks this seemingly dichotomous state-society cyber relationship and finds that cyberspace in China is a fragmented and pluralist space. While China scholars over the last several decades have demonstrated a decentralized system with tensions between local and central governments in the areas of public services and economic reforms, Han successfully shows that the same logic applies to cyberspace and control over the Internet. Moreover, netizens are a diverse group of anti-regime, pro-regime, and politically neutral individuals who often compete against each other in an effort to influence public opinion. Few studies have closely examined the pluralist nature of the Internet in China. Han provides a well-written and comprehensive study on Internet censorship and online discourse in China and breaks down the assumption that the Internet is inherently regime-challenging. Indeed, he shows that the Internet is not a threat to the regime. However, this is not due to state control over the Internet and censorship, but rather due to the uneven control and pluralism of cyberspace.

Han presents a unique and complex picture of censorship and control. First, he shows the dual strategy that central and local governments use to influence online opinion. One is traditional propaganda and censorship through filters and keywords, and the other is direct state engagement in online discourse through an army of paid online commentators. Since the introduction of the Internet in China, the central government has attempted to block content, including regime critics and anti-regime discourse. At the same time, the central leadership has allowed some online discussions to expose local corruption. This serves as a “fire alarm” to alert higher officials to local misdeeds. Yet, motivated netizens are able to get around filters and firewalls. Han shows how the party-state has adapted to the changing cyber environment beyond traditional censorship. The government began to directly engage in cyber discourse through online news sources, programs, and an army of Internet commentators who can monitor and counter anti-government online posts. The pro-government online commenters are